Agent-Centric Zero Trust
High-Level Overview
Iron Book applies Zero Trust security to AI agents. No agent is implicitly trusted by network location or role; instead, every agent action is continuously authenticated and authorized. The platform enforces micro-segmentation of agent workloads and real-time context checks. In practice, this means every request from an agent carries proof of identity and intent, and Iron Book evaluates these against policies on the fly.
A unified session and trust framework ensures that agents must continuously prove their integrity, and any sign of compromise immediately revokes access. This approach mitigates risks from rogue or compromised agents by requiring least-privilege access at all times.
Technical Architecture
Session Enforcement & Revocation
Iron Book maintains a global session management layer for agent interactions. When an agent logs in (or registers a new session), the system issues it a short-lived access token bound to its DID. Each token is cryptographically signed and checked on every request. If any policy violation or risk trigger occurs (e.g. unusual behavior or credential expiration), the global session is revoked instantly – subsequent requests are denied. This ensures consistent enforcement across all agent communication protocols.
Just-In-Time Credentials
Agent credentials (e.g. access tokens, keys) are issued on-demand with limited scope and lifetime. For example, when a workflow requires a new tool, Iron Book can perform Just-In-Time (JIT) credential issuance to that agent with only the needed capability. Once the task completes or if a revocation is triggered, the credential expires or is invalidated. This dynamic issuance reduces standing privileges.
Context-Aware Multi-Factor Checks
Depending on context (time, location, behavior), Iron Book can require additional proofs. For instance, an agent accessing sensitive data from an unusual environment might need an extra signed attestation or a ZKP proving certain compliance.
Cryptographically-Enforced Isolation
Agents communicate over mutually authenticated channels (e.g. DIDComm or mTLS) so that each party’s identity is verified. The Zero Trust overlay supports multiple protocols (A2A, MCP, HTTP APIs), but uniform identity checks ensure consistency.
Developer Integration (Example)
Agents obtain and present short-lived tokens on each call. For instance, using OAuth2 with a DID-based client assertion:
// Pseudocode: Agent requests an access token using its DID
token_response = IronBook.Auth.request_token({
"grant_type": "client_credentials",
"client_id": agent_did,
"client_assertion_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer",
"client_assertion": sign_jwt(claims={"sub": agent_did, "aud": IronBookAuthURL})
})
access_token = token_response["access_token"]
// Include token on API call
response = requests.get("https://api.enterprise.local/data", headers={
"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}"
})
Iron Book’s SDK abstracts this flow. On each API call, the agent SDK automatically refreshes tokens and includes signed proofs of its identity and requested action. If the token is revoked (due to session termination), the SDK will re-authenticate and acquire a new token or fail securely.
Compliance & Standards Mapping
Enforcing zero trust for agents helps meet regulatory controls around segmentation, multi-factor, and continuous monitoring:
Standard | Iron Book Compliance |
---|---|
PCI DSS | Requires “network segmentation” and stringent access control. Iron Book’s agent isolation and mandatory re-authentication align with PCI’s principle of isolating sensitive networks and never trusting by default. |
SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria) | Zero Trust satisfies CC6.1 (restrict logical access to authorized users) by treating agents as distinct identities. Global session control ensures only authenticated agents access data. |
ISO 42001 | Emphasizes ongoing risk assessment for AI. Iron Book’s continuous trust evaluation and revocation capability support compliant risk management. |
GLBA | Financial data rules (e.g. GLBA Safeguards Rule) demand controls on nonpublic information. Agents accessing such data are re-verified for each session, satisfying “secure systems” requirements. |
HIPAA | Calls for automatic logoff and unique user identification. Zero Trust ensures agents have unique IDs and that sessions terminate on anomalies. |
GDPR | While GDPR does not prescribe zero trust, continuous verification and minimal access align with “privacy by design” (Article 25) – agents only access data strictly needed for their task. |
IAM Interoperability
Iron Book works with enterprise IAM flows. For example, in Azure Entra ID an agent’s DID can be registered as a service principal. Clients (agents) authenticate via the OpenID Connect client_credentials flow, using Iron Book’s token endpoint (which trusts the agent’s DID). Entra Conditional Access policies can reference Iron Book-issued claims (e.g. requiring agent device compliance).
In AWS Cognito, agents can authenticate using a custom provider: Iron Book can expose an OAuth2-compatible endpoint so that Cognito considers it a trusted IdP, enabling Cognito-issued tokens for agent-initiated Lambdas.
Legacy OAuth2/OIDC systems can use Iron Book as an external token authority for agents, mapping agent capabilities to OAuth scopes.
Updated 5 days ago